A former chief financial officer who oversaw Canadian, US operations indicted for wire fraud, identity theft
A former chief financial officer (CFO) who oversaw the North American operations of an international engineering firm is facing serious criminal charges after allegedly committing executive fraud, according to an indictment announcement in the US.
Teresa Desy Majo, 42, allegedly manufactured fake documents and doctored emails from senior leaders in the organization to grant herself thousands of dollars in unauthorized compensation and benefits. The case, which affected Maccaferri Canada and Maccaferri USA, legal entities of Maccaferri S.p.A., an Italy-basd geotechnical engineering solutions manufacturer, is one to watch for human resources and legal professionals across Canada who manage executive compensation, payroll controls, and internal oversight.
Majo was formerly a legal permanent resident from Italy residing in the US and served as CFO for the two North American branches of Maccaferri. On June 15, 2026, the US Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland announced her indictment on charges of wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and possession of a perjured immigration document, according to the U.S. Department of Justice press release. An indictment is not a finding of guilt and all individuals charged by indictment are presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Executive’s fraud scheme
According to the indictment, the alleged scheme began in January 2021 and continued through May 2024 — a period of more than three years. Prosecutors allege that Majo created multiple fabricated documents that purported to authorize additional employment compensation and benefits. She also allegedly modified emails sent by other Maccaferri executives to make them appear to approve further unwarranted pay and perks. Those counterfeit documents were then submitted to the payroll departments of both Maccaferri USA and Maccaferri Canada.
The specific benefits Majo allegedly secured for herself included reimbursement for in vitro fertilization treatments and tuition fees for the Columbia Business School Chief Financial Officer program, reported CFO Dive. The US Attorney's Office stated that Majo used multiple executives' identities to fraudulently approve the alleged benefits and compensation — a tactic that exploited the trust inherently placed in a senior finance leader with access to financial systems and internal communications.
The alleged misconduct extended beyond the workplace. After Maccaferri terminated Majo's employment, she is accused of withholding news of her dismissal from US immigration authorities and otherwise providing false information in order to obtain legal permanent resident status. She now faces a separate charge of possessing a perjured immigration document in connection with that conduct.
Former executive could face decades in prison
If convicted on all counts, Majo faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison for wire fraud, along with a mandatory consecutive sentence of two years for aggravated identity theft, and up to 10 years for the immigration-related offence. The investigation was conducted by the FBI Baltimore Field Office. Officine Maccaferri S.p.A., Maccaferri USA, and Maccaferri Canada did not respond to media requests for comment.
Cases like this serve as a direct signal to Canadian HR executives and chief people officers that internal controls over executive compensation and payroll authorization require regular, independent review. When a single individual holds authority over both financial approvals and communications with payroll departments — without sufficient oversight — the conditions for potential misconduct can go undetected for years. The Maccaferri case allegedly persisted for more than three years before termination occurred.
For HR leaders responsible for governance and risk management, the case underscores the value of segregation of duties, periodic third-party audits of executive pay, and whistleblower mechanisms that sit outside the direct chain of command. It also raises important questions about the processes companies use when terminating a senior executive who has access to digital communications systems.
The case also has implications for how companies handle executive transitions and the immediate revocation of system access upon dismissal. In an era when email modification is technically straightforward — and when payroll systems may process approved documents with limited secondary verification — Canadian HR directors managing executive offboarding should review whether their organizations have the necessary digital audit trails and approval redundancies in place.
The case is a reminder that trust placed in senior executives must be matched by proportionate accountability mechanisms — and that payroll authorization, however senior the approver, should never be a single point of failure.
