The phrase "no later than" in her letter became the center of an FWC dispute
A physiotherapist's vague resignation letter turned into a Fair Work Commission battle over whether she quit or was pushed out.
Ashleigh Childs worked as a part-time paediatric physiotherapist at Smilestones Therapy Pty Ltd, having commenced employment on January 6, 2025. On August 28, 2025, she submitted her resignation. Her letter stated her final working day would be "no later than 25 September 2025."
That phrase became the center of a dispute that would land before the Fair Work Commission.
The next day, Kim Fischer from Smilestones responded with a different timeline. She informed Childs her final working day would be September 11, 2025. Childs acknowledged the change on September 1, 2025, noting in her response that the employer did not wish her to work the final two weeks of the notice period.
Her employment ended on September 11, 2025. But the matter was far from over.
On September 28, 2025, Childs filed an application with the Fair Work Commission alleging she had been dismissed in contravention of general protections laws. She argued that Smilestones had terminated her employment early to avoid paying her for the final two weeks, contending this was an act of discrimination based on her resignation.
Smilestones disputed the claim entirely. The company maintained that Childs had resigned voluntarily and both parties had agreed on the end date. As a small business with fewer than 15 employees, they noted they were only required to provide one week's notice under the Health Professionals and Support Services Award 2020 for an employee who had worked less than one year. The two-week period agreed upon with Childs exceeded that minimum.
Commissioner Durham took up the case and identified the key question: Had Childs resigned, or had she been dismissed?
On January 23, 2026, the Commissioner issued a decision that hinged on the language Childs had used in her resignation letter. The phrase "no later than 25 September 2025" clearly indicated the final date had not been firmly established, the Commissioner found. It was reasonable for Smilestones to respond with their preferred end date.
The critical detail was that Childs had acknowledged and agreed to September 11, 2025. She later claimed she only agreed because she believed she would still be paid through September 25, 2025.
The Commission found no evidence to support that expectation. Nothing in the correspondence or Childs' employment contract indicated Smilestones had agreed to pay her beyond her last working day. The Commissioner determined her belief "appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the notice provisions."
The Award permitted parties to agree to shorten notice periods but contained no provisions allowing either party to demand a longer one. The agreed date provided two weeks' notice, surpassing the required one week and remaining compliant with the Award.
Commissioner Durham concluded that Childs had "resigned from her employment voluntarily" and found no termination at the employer's initiative. The application was dismissed.
The case underscores a risk that HR teams encounter morhan they might expect. When employees submit resignations with uncertain end dates, the response matters. A specific proposed date, documented agreement, and clear communication about payment terms can prevent a voluntary resignation from morphing into a wrongful termination claim months later. The Commission made clear that mutual agreement on a notice period does not convert a resignation into a dismissal, but only if that agreement is explicit and properly recorded.
