He had a lawyer, an accountant and a union rep - the court was unimpressed
A senior lecturer signed a deal to leave Swinburne University of Technology. Then he spent two years trying to undo it.
The Federal Court of Australia on September 21, 2026, found that a deed of release - an agreement in which both sides agree to walk away and not sue each other - between the university and the academic was valid and enforceable, rejecting all four grounds the lecturer raised to challenge it.
The backstory starts in mid-2024. The lecturer, a senior academic in Swinburne's law school, had been raising concerns about grade distribution, grade inflation and teaching standards since 2019. By July 2024, Swinburne had started a formal disciplinary process, alleging serious misconduct.
The allegations, set out in a letter dated July 29, 2024, covered conduct stretching back to 2022. A second letter followed on August 14, concerning a department meeting. The lecturer denied wrongdoing. He maintained the allegations were being used against him because he had objected to grade inflation or possible grade manipulation.
The National Tertiary Education Industry Union stepped in. It lodged a dispute on the lecturer's behalf and pushed back on Swinburne's characterisation of the conduct as serious misconduct. A meeting between the parties on September 2, 2024, did not resolve the standoff.
On September 5, the union raised the idea of a mutual separation agreement with the university.
The following week, on September 11, Swinburne sent a group email to eligible staff about its Voluntary Early Retirement Program, offering six months' salary to employees aged 55 or over with at least five years of continuous service. The lecturer met the criteria.
What followed was a rapid negotiation. The lecturer's evidence was that he told the union his preferred exit figure was 12 months' pay, that he would not accept less than six months, and that accrued leave and references were additional. He said he was "amenable to signing a standard deed of release."
A first draft came from Swinburne on September 12. It offered 26 weeks' salary - $67,493 - described as "an ex gratia payment to be taxed according to law." The union representative reviewed it with the lecturer and replied the next day: "For the most part we are happy with it."
Here is where the dispute really begins.
The union asked whether the lecturer would receive a letter of service stating his employment had ended under the Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme. Swinburne's HR consultant replied that the "financial terms offered are equivalent to what [the lecturer] may have access to, were the University to accept his application for VERP." But, the consultant added, actual VERP participants who requested a statement of service received one referencing resignation. The lecturer's statement would be the same.
The lecturer obtained tax advice on September 16. His accountant calculated that a tax-free amount of approximately $50,108 would apply - but only if the arrangement qualified as an early retirement scheme under Division 83 of the Income Tax Assessment Act. The accountant's advice relied on that assumption. The lecturer did not provide his accountant with any of the Swinburne emails or the VERP information published online, which stated that payments under the program would be taxed as Employment Termination Payments - a standard tax category with no special tax-free threshold.
Armed with the tax advice, the lecturer instructed his union representative to request that the deed describe the payment as "a voluntary early retirement scheme payment to be taxed according to law."
Swinburne rejected the wording. The HR consultant's response on September 17 was direct: "the financial settlement is equivalent to what [the lecturer] would receive under VERP but it is not correct to say that it is a 'voluntary early retirement scheme payment.'"
That exchange proved decisive.
Four of five requested amendments to the deed were accepted. That one was not. The "ex gratia" label was dropped but not reinstated. The final deed simply identified the sum, stated it was equivalent to 26 weeks' salary, and said it would be "taxed according to law."
The lecturer signed on September 18, 2024. His resignation took effect the next day.
On October 3, he raised concerns with the university about the nature and amount of the payments he received. He then lodged a general protections application - a claim under the Fair Work Act that an employer has taken action against a worker for exercising a workplace right - in the Fair Work Commission. Over the months that followed, he commenced multiple Federal Court proceedings. Four of those proceedings involved the question of whether the deed was valid.
At the heart of his challenge was a single contention: he believed "VERP equivalence" meant more than just the gross 26-week payment. He said it encompassed salary and superannuation continuing until December 24, 2024 - the ordinary retirement date for approved VERP participants - and the favourable tax treatment of an approved early retirement scheme. The court found, however, that the references to VERP equivalence in the correspondence could only be understood as referring to the financial amount: 26 weeks' salary, the same that any participant in the Swinburne VERP would receive.
The court dealt with the lecturer's four grounds in turn.
On the first - that there was no binding agreement because the parties meant different things - the court held that the terms of the deed were clear. The resignation date, the payment amount and the payment timeline were all specified. One party's subjective belief about what the deal meant did not change the fact that a binding agreement existed.
On the second - that Swinburne misled him by maintaining a "financial equivalence" claim while delivering a narrower outcome - the court found no misleading representation was made. The September 17 email explicitly said it was "not correct" to call the payment a voluntary early retirement scheme payment. The court noted the lecturer's tax advice was obtained the day before that email, meaning the assumption about favourable tax treatment could not logically have been triggered by it.
On the third - that Swinburne knew about his misunderstanding and failed to correct it - the court held that having a requested change to the deed rejected did not mean the lecturer could proceed as if the amendment had been accepted. The court found no evidence Swinburne was aware of his specific misapprehensions.
On the fourth - that the deed was itself part of a broader campaign of adverse action - the court found this ground "very difficult to reconcile with logic or authority." The deed conferred a benefit on the lecturer that he freely accepted after taking advice.
The court noted several times that the lecturer was a qualified lawyer, admitted in Queensland. He had obtained independent legal and accounting advice. He had the benefit of union representation throughout the negotiations. And the deed itself contained a clause in which he acknowledged he had been given the opportunity to obtain professional advice and was satisfied the terms were fair and reasonable.
But for the taxation treatment - his own assumption, not a representation from Swinburne - the court observed the lecturer "got almost entirely what he sought: six months' pay, payment of accrued annual leave, and a statement of service recording his position and resignation."
The question of whether the deed actually bars each specific claim in the individual proceedings was referred back to the respective docket judges for further case management.
For HR teams negotiating exit agreements, the case is a sharp illustration of why precise, unambiguous deed language matters - and why a documented trail of what was offered, refused and accepted is the strongest protection when a departing employee later tries to unwind the deal.
The decision concerned a separate question about the validity of the deed of release. The court made no findings on the underlying allegations between the parties, which remain to be determined in the individual proceedings.
