Federal Circuit ruling maps how general protections claims can be framed after internal complaints
A West Australian yacht club has failed to obtain a court order forcing a former general manager to provide further particulars of his workplace rights claim - though the court confirmed the club is entitled to know the basis of that claim, and found the former GM had already supplied it. The May 19, 2026 ruling offers a useful map for HR teams handling general protections cases.
Michael Sassella ran South of Perth Yacht Club as General Manager from January 2023. The club terminated him on January 24, 2025. In March 2025, he filed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court alleging the club fired him because he had exercised workplace rights, breaching s 340 of the Fair Work Act.
According to the judgment, Sassella relies on three acts as the exercise of those rights. In May 2024, he raised what he calls a "Bullying Complaint" with the club, citing alleged defamatory comments published about his conduct as General Manager. In October 2024, he lodged a "WorkSafe Report" with WorkSafe Western Australia. Later that month, his lawyers sent a "Letter of Complaint" to the club alleging bullying and breaches of work health and safety law, and flagging a potential stop-bullying application to the Fair Work Commission or a workers compensation claim.
The club asked the court to order Sassella to file particulars showing the contract, instrument or law that entitled him to make each complaint under s 341(1)(c) of the Fair Work Act. In plain terms: identify the source of your right to complain, so the club knows the case it has to meet.
Judge Ladhams declined.
The judgment walks through the law on workplace rights. An employee bringing a general protections claim has to show they exercised a workplace right. On the authorities, the ability to make a complaint must be underpinned by an entitlement - it doesn't arise just because someone feels there's something to complain about. But the entitlement doesn't have to be a clause in a contract that expressly grants a right to complain. On the court's reading of the authorities, an underlying right - such as the right to a safe workplace or the right not to be bullied - can supply the necessary source.
Sassella's lawyers had already set this out in a May 26, 2025 letter. They pointed to his right to a safe workplace under ss 3 and 19 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), the employer's duty in tort and implied contractual duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to employees, and his right not to be bullied under Part 6-4B of the Fair Work Act. For the Letter of Complaint, they added his right to make a workers compensation claim under the Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WA).
The club's position, as recorded in the judgment, was that the letter described its own duties as employer rather than identifying Sassella's right to complain. The judge wasn't persuaded. The information was enough, she found, for the club to understand the basis on which Sassella says he was able to make each complaint.
Judge Ladhams accepted the club's broader point that civil penalty cases need to be clearly pleaded - a contravention finding under the Fair Work Act carries real stigma for an employer. She also held that the club was entitled to know the basis on which Sassella says the complaints were ones he was able to make, and acknowledged that his Form 2 did not on its own clearly identify the source of that ability. But she found the Form 2 was significantly clearer than the statement of claim in a case the club's counsel had cited by way of analogy, and that the May 26 letter did clearly identify the source. Sassella had defined each complaint, annexed copies of the two that were in writing, and clearly identified the making of them as the workplace rights he was relying on.
The application for further particulars was dismissed. The substantive claim has not yet been heard. The club has not admitted that Sassella exercised any workplace right, and the onus remains on him to establish both that he made the complaints and that doing so amounted to exercising a workplace right within the meaning of s 341(1)(c).
For HR teams, the case offers an early read on how the courts approach these questions. When an employee raises a bullying complaint, files a WorkSafe report, or sends a lawyer's letter alleging unsafe systems, the court's reasoning suggests those acts can be framed as the exercise of workplace rights without needing to find a clause in the contract that says "you may complain." If those acts are accepted as the exercise of workplace rights, a subsequent termination can sit inside the general protections regime, with the reverse onus that goes with it. The case is a reminder to document the reasons for any termination that follows internal complaints, WorkSafe contact, or workers compensation activity.
