Court awards plaintiffs more than $500,000 in damages
A court has found that employees of an adoption company made deceptive, false, and misleading representations, including failing to properly screen the birth mother, and that the company was vicariously liable for their misconduct.
The defendants in the case of Casey et al. v. Hill et al. were Unique Adoptions, Inc., a California corporation, and Patrice Hill, who was its sole owner and a California resident. The plaintiffs, who were spouses and Missouri residents, wanted to adopt a child.
Unique’s agent told the plaintiffs that they had an adoption opportunity relating to an expectant mother living in California and presented them with an adoption facilitation agreement. In July 2015, the plaintiffs signed the agreement in Missouri, paid the $15,500 fee via wire transfer from Missouri to Unique’s California bank account, and started paying a monthly $1,255 fee to cover the mother’s expenses. Hill signed the agreement on Unique’s behalf.
From July to September 2015, Pat Boucher, alongside fellow Unique employees, served as the plaintiffs’ main contact person. Boucher was a go-between who relayed information between the plaintiffs and Hill. In September 2015, the plaintiffs started communicating directly with Hill.
The plaintiffs then found out that the mother in question was not a viable adoption opportunity and was not going to put up her child for adoption. Hill had not met the mother and had not properly screened her.
In 2016, the plaintiffs filed a suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants in a Missouri court. They made claims for violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.
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The Missouri court awarded the plaintiffs a total judgment of $547,960, consisting of $31,175 in compensatory damages, $15,375 in attorney fees, $1,410 in costs, and $500,000 in punitive damages. The court made the following findings:
- The defendants, through their words and actions, made deceptive, false, and misleading representations to the plaintiffs;
- Hill’s and Boucher’s representations were within the course and scope of their employment;
- Unique was vicariously liable for Hill’s and Boucher’s misconduct;
- The defendants were liable under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.
Under California’s Sister State Money Judgments Act, the plaintiffs applied in the San Diego Superior Court for entry of the Missouri judgment in the amount of $592,171.75, inclusive of interest. The clerk of the San Diego court granted this application.
In California, the defendants moved to vacate entry of the Missouri judgment under section 1710.40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to vacate entry of the sister state judgment in California. The plaintiffs appealed.
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division One reversed the trial court’s decision and instructed the trial court to deny the motion to vacate entry of the Missouri judgment.
The appellate court found that Missouri’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the California defendants was constitutional. The appellate court then rejected the other defenses that the California defendants raised against the recognition of the sister state judgment.
The defendants made numerous communications – including emails, text messages, and phone calls – that contained the alleged misrepresentations and that caused the harm that was the essence of the plaintiffs’ claims in Missouri, the appellate court said.
While Hill did not make all these communications personally, the plaintiff claimed that Boucher informed him that Hill – who oversaw and directed all the work of Unique’s employees – was the source of the information in the communications, and that Boucher was merely passing this information back and forth, the appellate court noted.
For her part, Hill did not deny that she oversaw and directed Boucher’s activities or that she was the source of the information that the plaintiffs received.
