Medical evidence filed after the application deadline could not save this worker's late claim
A bullying complaint, a termination four months later, and a Fair Work ruling that leaves the harder HR question unanswered.
On 20 March 2026, Fair Work Commissioner Fox dismissed an unfair dismissal application filed by Michael Curry against his former employer, Ampac Pty Ltd. The case turned on a procedural point: Curry had filed his application seven days past the 21-day statutory deadline. But the facts that led to his termination are where things get interesting for HR professionals.
Curry had lodged a bullying complaint with HR at Ampac in August 2025. He later told the Commission he felt that following the complaint, management was trying to "push him out of the job." He also told the Commission he had raised his voice during a meeting with management and that this was used to justify his termination. When he returned to the office following a period of suspension, he was handed a termination letter on 22 December 2025. Ampac's stated reason was unacceptable workplace conduct.
The letter, dated 19 December 2025, read: "This behaviour is unacceptable and has resulted in a loss of confidence in your ability to continue your employment in a manner consistent with Company standards. Accordingly, your employment with Ampac Pty Ltd is terminated effective Monday 22nd December 2025 in accordance with Company policy and applicable Australian workplace laws."
Whether the termination itself was fair was never examined. Commissioner Fox was tasked only with deciding whether exceptional circumstances existed to allow the late application to proceed at all. The answer was no.
Curry argued the delay was caused by significant stress and anxiety following the end of his employment. He provided medical evidence, but the Commission found it post-dated the filing of his own application on 19 January 2026. His first medical appointment was on 2 February 2026, also after the 21-day window had already closed. The Commission further noted that Curry had been capable enough to contact Ampac on 12 January 2026, within the relevant period, to request his dismissal documents.
The Commission drew on established authority in finding that "stress, shock, confusion and similar conditions are not exceptional circumstances in and of themselves." Curry had also acknowledged he was unaware of the 21-day time limit, which case law consistently holds is not a valid basis for an extension.
With no factors weighing in favour of granting an extension, the application was dismissed. The question of whether Curry's termination was connected to his earlier bullying complaint was never put to the test.
That unresolved thread is what gives this case its resonance for HR. A conduct-based dismissal occurring four months after a formal bullying complaint creates a sequence that, regardless of its merits, invites scrutiny. The Commission acknowledged the facts were contested but went no further.
For HR leaders and people managers, the case offers clear practical reference points. Well-dated and specific termination documentation, as demonstrated in this case, can anchor an employer's position from the outset of any dispute. When a disciplinary process follows a formal complaint, the independence of that process and how thoroughly it is documented may be the critical factor in distinguishing a defensible decision from an exposed one. Informing departing employees of their rights, including applicable timeframes to pursue claims, also reflects procedurally sound practice that can reduce the likelihood of procedural disputes entirely.
The substantive question at the heart of this case remains open. But for HR professionals managing the space between complaints and conduct, that is precisely the point.
